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    SPF records - for all A records?

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    • DashrenderD
      Dashrender
      last edited by

      I'm reading up on SPF/DKIM/DMARC and ran across several posts where people indicate they create SPF records for all all A records in their DNS (not sure why they would skip C Names?)

      Is this really necessary? Does anyone else here do that?

      Here is one such comment

      It is a best practice to have a "does not send" SPF record (i.e. "v=spf1 -all") on every HOST within a domain that doesn't otherwise have a different SPF record -- as well as for the domain itself plus any non-host label in the domain that has MX or SMTP-service-SRV records. The idea is to permit detection that the host-part of a sending mailbox is forged, and for those idiots that don't check others' SPF records, that you have protected all possible labels in your domain that could be backscatter targets.

      JaredBuschJ 1 2 Replies Last reply Reply Quote 0
      • JaredBuschJ
        JaredBusch @Dashrender
        last edited by

        @dashrender said in SPF records - for all A records?:

        I'm reading up on SPF/DKIM/DMARC and ran across several posts where people indicate they create SPF records for all all A records in their DNS (not sure why they would skip C Names?)

        Because people are stupid? Nothing in SPF prevents any bad actor from doing anything with any domain or sub domain.

        Sure, for the systems that listen to SPF, it will drop the inbound mail. But it still has to process the inbound mail to check the SPF before it decides to not deliver it. So there is no help in slowing what hits your system.

        Today, most systems also will flag anything without valid SPF as high risk of SPAM already, so there is really not much difference.

        DashrenderD 1 Reply Last reply Reply Quote 1
        • DashrenderD
          Dashrender @JaredBusch
          last edited by

          @jaredbusch Thanks - I figured it was really unnecessary work that really probably doesn't provide any real benefit.

          Obviously you want to protect your mailing domain, and you might as well be a good net-i-zen and create empty SPF records for your non -mailing domains, but all the hosts? nah.

          JaredBuschJ 1 Reply Last reply Reply Quote 0
          • JaredBuschJ
            JaredBusch @Dashrender
            last edited by

            @dashrender said in SPF records - for all A records?:

            @jaredbusch Thanks - I figured it was really unnecessary work that really probably doesn't provide any real benefit.

            Obviously you want to protect your mailing domain, and you might as well be a good net-i-zen and create empty SPF records for your non -mailing domains, but all the hosts? nah.

            The reasoning is for backscatter. But no system deployed correctly has a problem with it anyway.

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              1337 @Dashrender
              last edited by 1337

              @dashrender said in SPF records - for all A records?:

              I'm reading up on SPF/DKIM/DMARC and ran across several posts where people indicate they create SPF records for all all A records in their DNS (not sure why they would skip C Names?)

              Is this really necessary? Does anyone else here do that?

              Here is one such comment

              It is a best practice to have a "does not send" SPF record (i.e. "v=spf1 -all") on every HOST within a domain that doesn't otherwise have a different SPF record -- as well as for the domain itself plus any non-host label in the domain that has MX or SMTP-service-SRV records. The idea is to permit detection that the host-part of a sending mailbox is forged, and for those idiots that don't check others' SPF records, that you have protected all possible labels in your domain that could be backscatter targets.

              It's indeed best practice to do so.
              http://www.open-spf.org/FAQ/Common_mistakes/#all-domains

              I haven't bothered though. But I have DKIM and DMARC also setup. If both SPF and DKIM fails, the DMARC policy instructs the receiver to completely reject the email.

              Just using SPF isn't an effective measure against spoofed emails. DKIM adds a secure signature to each mail and DMARC is the policy on what the receiving end should do.

              From received DMARC reports you can see when servers are trying to spoof your domain's email addresses.

              BTW you only need to add an SPF for the A record because that is where the IP address is. CNAME is just a pointer to another A record.

              Use something like this to check you SPF records:
              https://www.dmarcanalyzer.com/spf/checker/
              On this one you'll see how SPF records are resolved to IP addresses, sometimes in multiple levels.

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              • DashrenderD
                Dashrender
                last edited by Dashrender

                This site is pretty good also for checking the whole mailing stack
                https://www.checktls.com/TestReceiver

                1 1 Reply Last reply Reply Quote 0
                • 1
                  1337 @Dashrender
                  last edited by 1337

                  @dashrender said in SPF records - for all A records?:

                  This site is pretty good also for checking the whole mailing stack
                  https://www.checktls.com/TestReceiver

                  That one was new to me. I'm going to check it out.

                  Another awesome resource, one that can test your own email from the receiving end is https://www.learndmarc.com/
                  It just great and will explain what happens.

                  It's made by uriports. We just started to evaluate their DMARC report monitoring service. Looking good so far.

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